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Abstract 
 
This paper revisits the resilience of the ASEAN region to external shocks amidst the unfolding 
effects of the US-China trade war. It investigates and compares the effects of regional 
(ASEAN) and global (US, China) shocks on ASEAN-5 using a structural VAR framework. To 
identify the propagation of economic shocks and spillovers on ASEAN-5, the changing trade 
links between the economies considered are used to account for time variations spanning the 
period 1978Q1 to 2018Q2. Three major results follow from the analyses on trade links and 
output multiplier effects. First, the response of ASEAN-5 to shocks from the US and China 
were more pronounced than regional shocks for the period after the Asian financial crisis.  
Second, the increasing cumulative impact of China’s shock on ASEAN was congruous to the 
growing trade links and trade intensities between ASEAN and China. Third, the US and China 
were dominant growth drivers for the weaker trade-linked ASEAN partners. Taken together, 
the results suggest that global shocks matter for the region, and the economic resilience of the 
region to global shocks depends on indirect effects, apart from the direct trade links. 
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1. Introduction 
The United States-China trade war that began in January 2018 has raised the stakes for trade 
and economic growth in Southeast Asia.  This is because Southeast Asia is an integral part of 
production networks, particularly in electronics, in which China, ASEAN’s single largest 
trading partner, occupies a nodal position (Huang, Salike & Zhong, 2017). The Association of 
the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a region is dependent on third markets, such as the 
United States (US), through its trade with China (Prana, 2018). Through supply chains, 
ASEAN is affected by the trade wars as the top ten US imports from China facing increased 
tariffs include segments of the electronics industry, such as telecommunications equipment, 
computer circuit boards and processing units (Thomas, 2019). As such, de-globalization 
following from the American-Sino trade war could rupture the triangular trade patterns that 
prevail between ASEAN, China and the US. 
 Notwithstanding the above, there are optimistic accounts that trade will bring about 
some strategic and positive consequences for the region, such as trade diversions from three 
perspectives: China to ASEAN; US to ASEAN; and ASEAN to other ASEAN member states 
(AMS). The trade war, apparently, is already causing the shifting of supply chains (Tobin & 
Power, 2019), namely the relocation of lower value-added activities to countries like Vietnam 
(Thomas, 2019), and the surge in exports of components from China to ASEAN (Yeo, 2018).  
Moeller (2018) adds that the repercussions on overall economic growth in Southeast Asia from 
this trade war will be minimal when compared with the crises episodes, the Asian financial 
crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008-2009.  Others argue, 
however, that any positive effects from the trade war for the region would be short-term (Anya, 
2019), as the war could escalate beyond the US and China. 
Against this speculative debate of the unfolding effects of the trade war, the resilience 
of the ASEAN region to the direct1 and indirect2 shocks from the US-China trade war is called 
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into question. Moeller (2018) believes that for Southeast Asia, the indirect impact of the trade 
war will be more relevant and interesting to be analyzed.  With the nature of ASEAN’s 
interdependent trade with the two superpowers, the ongoing US-China trade war is an 
important global shock to be considered when debating the economic resilience of the region. 
In this regard, the impact on the ASEAN Member States (AMS) may vary due to their different 
trade dependence on China and the US. Singapore and Malaysia are potentially the most open 
and most exposed economies within the region, while Myanmar, Lao, Vietnam and Indonesia 
trade most intensively with China.  Alternatively, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are 
the most exposed to the US. 
This paper therefore investigates and compares the effects of regional (ASEAN) and 
global (US, China)3 trade shocks on ASEAN-5 using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
framework. This paper identifies the propagation of economic shocks and spillovers on 
ASEAN-5 using changing trade links between the economies considered to account for time 
variations spanning the period 1978Q1 to 2018Q2. The period of analysis includes the main 
economic episodes that have characterized the integration process of ASEAN, which are the 
AFC and the GFC.   
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature on trade 
interdependencies and its quantification. Section 3 describes the changing patterns of trade 
(export integration, trade intensity and trade balance) for the ASEAN-5 (five founding 
members - Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia), China and the US in 
bilateral relationships.   Section 4 details the data, methodology and estimation procedures. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and discusses the findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theory and Empirics 
Bilateral trade is an important source for inter-country business cycle linkages (Baxter & 
Kouparitsas, 2004; Imbs, 2004; Cheewatrakoolpong & Manprasert, 2014). Increasing trade 
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links may therefore lead to co-movements and increased volatility as they induce large demand-
side (contraction, expansion, substitution) effects. In the presence of production networks, the 
emphasis on common global (external) shocks is understandable, as the effects of the shocks 
can be transmitted indirectly (Cheewatrakoolpong & Manprasert, 2015; Sato & Shrestha, 2014) 
through induced changes in domestic production and trade in intermediate goods (parts and 
components or indirect trade). For example, the current US-China trade war is expected to 
cause a realignment of global supply chains in the ASEAN region (Tobin & Power, 2019). 
Arguably, the transmission of shocks to networked economies, in turn, can magnify the global 
shocks.  
The extant literature on trade interdependencies are largely based on formal modelling 
approaches, while some others are done in an off-model manner. Formal modelling approaches 
include the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to create different scenarios of 
shocks and identify their potential global economic impacts (Bollen & Rojan-Romagosa, 2018; 
Guo, Lu, Sheng & Yu, 2018), and global input-output tables that examine shock transmissions 
in terms of intermediate inputs (Sato & Shrestha, 2014). Econometric models, in turn, such as 
the SVAR and global VAR (GVAR) methods, are used to examine shocks according to impulse 
response function analyses.   
Following from the different methods used, the empirical literature on the trade 
channel4 as a transmission mechanism for propagating shocks across countries, however, 
remains at best mixed (Dungey, Khan & Raghavan, 2018). Several studies find a moderate or 
weak role for trade interdependence in propagating economic shocks (Canova, 1991; Canova 
& Dellas, 1993; Masson, 1998; Baig & Goldfajn, 1999; Harrigan, 2000; Blanchard, Das and 
Faruqee, 2010; Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack & Walsh, 2012). Alternatively, studies by Dungey 
and Martin (1998), Ito and Hashimoto (2005), Haidar (2012) and Dungen et al. (2018) identify 
that trade (both bilateral and competition via a third market) had some influence in explaining 
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the propagation of instabilities and output shocks in the international markets (see also Sato 
and Shrestha, 2014).  
Previous studies on the interdependence of trade (and income) in the context of the 
ASEAN region also do not provide any robust findings. While Lau (2008) concludes that 
ASEAN-5 and China are subject to common shocks, Yuning and Junyi (2016) observe that 
ASEAN-5 has become less integrated with China in terms of the growth rate after the GFC. 
This is supported by other studies that suggest a stronger regional influence of the US relative 
to China (Sato, Zhang, & McAleer, 2011; Feldkircher & Korhonen, 2014, Sato & Shrestha, 
2014; Dungey and Vehbi, 2015). On the contrary, Abeysinghe and Lu (2013) and Ong and 
Sato (2018) find multiplier effects of China on the regional economies. Ong and Sato (2018) 
show that Asia (including ASEAN-5) is affected by a China shock relative to a US shock, and 
with the exception for Malaysia and the Philippines, the remaining ASEAN-5 members are 
also positively affected by a shock from China.   
The conflicting findings justify a revisit to the issue of trade interdependence in the 
context of ASEAN, a group that is regionally networked, yet highly integrated with the global 
economy. The trade channel is also more relevant for ASEAN, relative to monetary and 
financial shocks. 
3. Trade Patterns: ASEAN5, China and the US 
The direct export exposure of ASEAN-5 to the markets of China and the US was 12.99 per 
cent and 9.62 per cent in 2018, respectively (calculated from ITC, 2019). The AMS, however, 
recorded varying degrees of integration with the region, China and the US.  Figure 1 presents 
the export shares of ASEAN-5 with China, US and the ASEAN region for the 1978 to 2018 
period.  Malaysia and Singapore are more integrated with the region than with China and the 
US. While the export integration of the individual ASEAN-5 with China appeared to have 
increased post-2000, the export shares with the US were on a downtrend. From an intra-
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ASEAN perspective (see Appendix Figure 1), Malaysia and Singapore also recorded the 
highest export exposure with the individual AMS. In fact, each of the three remaining countries, 
Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, displayed relatively higher degrees of integration either 
with Malaysia or Singapore, than with the other AMS. Conversely, the Philippines seemed to 
be less integrated with the region. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 Given the growing export links between the AMS and China, the trade intensity index 
is presented in Figure 2 to determine whether the value of trade between the ASEAN-5 with 
China and the US is greater or smaller than would be expected based on their importance in 
world trade. The trade intensity indices (albeit below one) between the AMS and China 
recorded an upward trend for the 1990 to 2018 period, while trade intensity with the US 
gradually declined over the same period. Unlike Singapore-US, the trade intensity index was 
considerably high for the Singapore-China case, expect for a drastic drop from 14.72 to 1.08 
between 2017 and 2018. While Indonesia’s trade intensity with China (US) was larger (smaller) 
than expected for the entire period of review, the trade intensity indices for Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines exceeded one only in the post 2000 period. Alternatively, trade intensity 
between the Philippines and the US was constantly greater than expected.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 Against the backdrop of increasing export integration and more evidence of larger than 
expected trade flows with China relative to the US, the deepening integration of trade activities 
between ASEAN-5 and China progressed with a widening of trade deficits since 2012 (Figure 
3). Conversely, ASEAN-5 recorded trade surpluses with the US for the entire 1992 to 2018 
period. The trade balances imply the importance of China as an import source for ASEAN-5, 
while the US, mainly as an export destination. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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4. Data and Methodology 
The database contains gross domestic product (GDP) growth and export share series5 of 
ASEAN-5, China and the US, spanning the period 1978Q1 to 2018Q26. The study uses 
quarterly7 GDP and bilateral export shares for each country to measure output and trade 
linkages, respectively. Quarterly GDP data, expressed in national currencies are obtained from 
International Financial Statistics, while quarterly exports data, reported in current US dollars, 
are extracted from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). GDP data for individual countries are transformed to US million dollars using oﬃcial 
exchange rates.  
Output growth rates are ﬁrst diﬀerences of log real GDP, where the X-12 procedure is 
applied when seasonal adjustment is required. The unit root tests of GDP growth series support 
the conclusion that the GDP growth series are stationary.  To measure bilateral-trade ﬂows, a 
trade-matrix (W) 8 is constructed with 12-quarter moving average export data, which results in 
a smooth varying W matrix, reducing noise in the data (see also Abeysinghe & Forbes, 2005). 
To examine the interdependence between each of the ASEAN economies with China 
the US and other ASEAN economies, we estimate a SVAR9 model employing quarterly data 
on GDP and export shares.  
A SVAR model representation is: 
𝐴𝐴0𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌 is a (4 × 1) vector of variables, the 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖 = 0, 1, 2,⋯ ,𝑝𝑝) are (4 × 4) matrices of 
coefficients with 𝐴𝐴0 normalised across the main diagonal. 𝐶𝐶 is the (4 × 1) vector of constants 
while 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is a (4 × 1) multivariate white noise error process with zero mean and a diagonal 
covariance matrix, 𝛴𝛴𝜀𝜀 containing the variances of the structural disturbances.  The 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  in (1) is 
represented as 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = �𝑌𝑌𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� 
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with   𝑌𝑌𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡;   𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡;  𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑖=1  
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the GDP growth rate for each of the ASEAN country in our sample, while 𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡  𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are growth rates for China, US and ASEAN respectively.  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 are 
the export shares, i.e. exports from ASEAN 𝑖𝑖 to China and the US respectively divided by total 
exports of ASEAN 𝑖𝑖 while  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the export share from ASEAN 𝑖𝑖  to ASEAN 𝑗𝑗 economies 
over total exports to ASEAN 𝑖𝑖. All these exports shares are changing over time. Since the US 
is the largest economy, 𝑌𝑌𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡is ordered first with the expectation that it has a flow-on effect on 
𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.  𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡 is ordered second and it interacts with 𝑌𝑌𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡 in the lags.  The smaller 
ASEAN economies are ordered last and assumed to be contemporaneously affected by the two 
larger economies. 
The SVAR framework enables us to capture both direct and indirect interdependencies 
via trade links between the two larger economies and the regional economies, observed through 
changing trade weights over time on each of the ASEAN economies.  This approach allows for 
the analysis of the impact of output shocks originating from China, the US and the ASEAN 
region with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of international trade links and illustrates how the 
propagation of shocks changes over time due to the transforming trade structure. 
The SVAR in (1) can be represented as: 
𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (2) 
where 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐴𝐴0 − 𝐴𝐴1𝐿𝐿 −⋯− 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 and 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = �𝜀𝜀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡, 𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡, 𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡, 𝜀𝜀i,𝑡𝑡 �′.  The disturbances, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡,  have economic meaning and therefore the 
effects of shocks originating from China (𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑡𝑡), the US (𝜀𝜀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡) and the ASEAN (𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡) on each 
of the economies are captured effectively by the impulse response functions given in (3): 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)−1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (3) 
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The impulse responses enable us to disentangle the impacts of a shock in one economy on 
another, highlighting the prevailing bilateral cross-border interdependencies. We compute 
impulse responses to illustrate how a shock to an individual country has a direct and indirect 
inﬂuence on other countries in the sample through trade-links and output-multiplier eﬀects. 
5. Results and Discussion 
In this section we present the impulse responses for the ASEAN-5 economies to demonstrate 
the dynamic nature of transmission mechanism of a country-specific shock. This is followed 
by estimates of the output multipliers to assess the direct and indirect effects of the regional 
and global shocks.  Since the overall period of study, 1978Q1 to 2018Q2, includes the post 
liberalization period in ASEAN-5 economies, and the AFC and the GFC, the timeframe of the 
analysis is further divided into three sub-periods to account for the pre- and post-crises, as 
reported in Table 1. We selected these sub-periods to examine the possible changes in 
international transmission mechanism with changes in the cross-border trade links among 
countries over time. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Figure 4 presents the impulse responses of each ASEAN-5 economies to a one-unit 
growth shock originating in the US, China and the ASEAN region respectively for the four 
sample periods described in Table 1.  Figure 4 shows that in the full sample period, the 
responses of each of the ASEAN-5 economies to one-unit shock from the ASEAN region are 
larger than those from the US or China, and they generally peak around the second quarter and 
taper of smoothly after 7th quarter. The responses of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (the 
three most open economies) to shocks originating from the US and China appear to have similar 
intensities.  The similar reactions of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to the global shocks 
plausibly reflect the similar levels of trade overlap or intra-industry trade (IIT)10 between these 
three AMS with China, at 29.32 per cent, 21.83 per cent and 25.08 per cent, respectively. The 
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IIT for the Philippines-China (11.24 per cent) and Indonesia-China (8.30 per cent) are much 
lower (calculated from UN Comtrade, 2019). 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
However, when we breakdown the sample into the pre- and post-AFC periods, different 
patterns emerge, which justify the sub-period analyses to capture the bilateral trade 
relationships that have evolved and matured (see also Figure 1). In the pre-AFC period, the 
shock originating from the ASEAN region had a larger and significant effects on these 
economies, while shocks from the US and China produced relatively smaller effects.  This 
implies, in the pre-AFC crisis period, the regional economic conditions were more important 
for these economies and they were less affected by conditions in the US or China.  
Alternatively, in the post-AFC period, particularly before the GFC period, the shock originating 
from the US had a more dominant impact on Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, while the 
shocks from China and the region (except for Malaysia) generated somewhat similar effects 
across all the economies.  Extending the period beyond the GFC, it was observed while the 
pattern of responses did not change that much, there was a slight decline in the intensity of the 
responses, partly due to the slowdown in global economic activity.  
Overall, the effects from both the US and China increased in the post-AFC period, 
implying the region’s growing connectivity with the world’s two largest economies. This is not 
surprising as China’s integration into the regional production networks only took off after its 
entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Huang, Salike & Zhong, 2017). 
Table 2 reports the normalized output multipliers and the export shares matrix output 
multipliers for 1997, 2008 and 2018 for the respective shocks from ASEAN, the US and China 
to each of the AMS.  The output multiplier is estimated as the cumulative impulse responses to 
external shocks after four quarters, showing the accumulated impact of a one-unit expansion 
in the GDP of external economies on the output growth of the ASEAN-5 economies.  The 
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normalized output multipliers are then estimated by dividing the four-quarter cumulative 
impulse responses by its own effect.  The responses of the AMS, with different trade-structures 
(see Section 3), are analyzed to capture the time varying nature of trade patterns. The influence 
of regional growth drivers was dominant in the ASEAN economies. From Table 2, we can 
clearly see that the propagation patterns had changed over the period.  For instance, although 
the US economy still dominated in triggering growth in ASEAN economies, the average impact 
was declining, while the cumulative average impact of China’s shock was rising (see also 
Abeysinghe and Lu, 2003). For example, Thailand’s cumulative response to a one-unit 
expansion in the US had declined from 0.176 in 1997 to 0.169 in 2018, while the responses to 
China had increased from 0.042 to 0.146. Though the evidence contradicts with previous 
findings of smaller output shocks from China relative to the US (Dungey & Vehbi, 2011; Sato 
et al., 2011; Utlaut & Van Roye, 2010; Genberg, 2005; Abeysinghe & Forbes, 2005), it is 
congruous with the changing trade patterns between ASEAN and China; growing export 
exposure and rising trade intensities (see Figures 1 and 2; Dungey & Vehbi, 2015).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We further find that the multiplier effects portray a different picture of the transmission 
of shocks than that provided by the bilateral trade flows, measured as export shares. The results 
indicate that the impact of shocks to a major trading partner of a country could be less 
influential than shocks in countries with lower trade links.  For instance, in 2018, in the cases 
of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, the US remained the dominant growth driver compared 
to China, whilst the three ASEAN economies respective export shares to China were in fact 
larger than to the US. Similarly, in 2008, the US remained the dominant growth driver 
compared to China for Singapore, though the latter’s export shares to China were considerably 
higher.  This demonstrates the significance of indirect multipliers when analyzing the 
importance of growth drivers, along with the direct trade patterns. 
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The reactions of the ASEAN-5 based on the impulse response and the output multipliers 
imply that the trade channel is indeed important for the region.  The asymmetric reactions are 
observed in accordance with the following: origin of the shocks (US, China and ASEAN 
region); sample period of analyses (pre- and post AFC); and nature of the transmission 
mechanism (direct and indirect).  The relative importance of the shocks (regional and global) 
and the asymmetric responses have important policy implications. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
It is widely recognized that countries engaged in production networks are highly vulnerable to 
common external shocks. This paper therefore focuses on the changing trade interdependencies 
between the ASEAN, China and US (two important trading partners of ASEAN) and 
empirically analyzes the cross-border transmission of regional and global shocks to the 
ASEAN-5 economies. Of interest are the ASEAN-5 effects of the global shocks originating in 
the US and China due to the ongoing US-China trade wars. 
 While the sub-period analyses indicate that the regionally networked ASEAN-5 is no 
longer resilient to the shocks originating from the US and China, particularly after the AFC, 
the results cast doubt on the expectations that ASEAN economies with greater export links 
with the global players should be more susceptible to their shocks.  On the contrary, the US 
and China are each found to be influential drivers of growth for the weaker trade-linked 
ASEAN partners. Meaning which, though some AMS may have low direct trade dependency 
with the US and/or China, they may indeed have high export exposure to the latter two 
countries if indirect linkages are included. This suggests that the indirect transmission 
mechanism cannot be ignored when examining the exposure and resilience of the small and 
open ASEAN economies to global (and regional) shocks.  Direct links alone may therefore fail 
to accurately capture the total trade exposure of ASEAN, and its resilience to external shocks 
beyond the region. 
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 The main message is that while economic uncertainties continue to surround the US-
China trade wars, the trade frictions on a global basis could ultimately have deeper and more 
enduring indirect implications for ASEAN. In short, trade linkages are an important 
transmission channel, and the sample choice matters as trade integration deepens and becomes 
more complex over time.  It may therefore be useful to investigate the sectoral indirect effects 
of cross-border transmission of trade shocks to provide specific input for resilience-building 
policies, so that ASEAN can better navigate such global trade shocks. Another valuable 
extension to this research would be to use trade measures (beyond export shares/ concentration) 
that include indirect trade linkages with the crisis originating country.  
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Figure 1: Export Shares with China, US and ASEAN-5, 1978Q1-2018Q4 
  
  
 
 
Notes: Export share refers to exports going to the partner (China/ US/ ASEAN-5) to total exports of the reporter 
(individual AMS). A higher export share indicates a higher degree of integration between countries. 
Source: IMF (2019) 
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Figure 2: Trade Intensities for ASEAN-5-China and ASEAN-5-US, 1990-2018 
 
ASEAN-5 and China 
 
 
ASEAN-5 and US 
 
Notes: The right axis refers to trade intensity for Singapore-China. The reporters are the individual AMS, and 
the partners are China and the US. The 2018 data is not available for the ASEAN-5-US. Trade intensity index is 
the ratio of trade share of a country to the share of world trade with China (partner). An index of more than one 
indicates that trade flow between countries is larger than expected given their importance in world trade. 
Source: ADB (2019) and ITC (2019). 
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Figure 3: ASEAN-5 - Trade Balances with China and the US, 1992-2018 (USD million) 
 
Notes: The right axis refers to China-US trade balances.  
Source: UN (2019) and ITC (2019). 
 
  
Figure 4: ASEAN-5 - Responses of GDP Growth to Shocks in US, China and ASEAN, 
by Periods 
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Philippines 
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Table 1: Timeframe of Analysis 
Description Timeframe 
Full period 1978:Q1 - 2018:Q2 
Pre-Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1978:Q1 - 1997:Q4 
Post-Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)  1999:Q1 - 2018:Q2 
Pre-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 1999:Q1 - 2008:Q2 
 
 
Table 2: ASEAN-5 - Ranked by Export Shares and Output Multipliers 
Q4 1997 Q2 2008 Q2 2018 
Export Rank Multiplier Rank Export Rank Multiplier Rank Export Rank Multiplier Rank 
Singapore           
Asean 0.290 Asean 0.541 Asean 0.285 Asean 0.621 Asean 0.239 Asean 0.647 
US 0.175 US 0.093 China 0.095 US 0.208 China 0.136 China 0.282 
China 0.026 China 0.087 US 0.089 China 0.192 US 0.069 US 0.219 
Malaysia           
Asean 0.267 Asean 0.634 Asean 0.242 Asean 0.840 Asean 0.251 Asean 0.785 
US 0.193 US 0.269 US 0.159 US 0.237 China 0.133 US 0.255 
China 0.025 China 0.177 China 0.084 China 0.119 US 0.097 China 0.154 
Thailand           
Asean 0.186 US 0.176 Asean 0.164 Asean 0.356 Asean 0.149 Asean 0.425 
US 0.181 Asean 0.057 US 0.132 US 0.159 China 0.117 US 0.169 
China 0.029 China 0.042 China 0.092 China 0.042 US 0.112 China 0.146 
Philippines           
US 0.348 US 0.249 US 0.175 Asean 0.337 US 0.150 Asean 0.414 
Asean 0.128 Asean 0.132 Asean 0.152 US 0.208 Asean 0.136 US 0.146 
China 0.012 China 0.066 China 0.106 China 0.067 China 0.112 China 0.122 
Indonesia           
Asean 0.144 Asean 0.192 Asean 0.177 Asean 0.501 Asean 0.206 Asean 0.417 
US 0.135 China 0.149 US 0.104 US 0.042 China 0.125 US 0.065 
China 0.039 US 0.136 China 0.084 China 0.036 US 0.109 China 0.033 
Notes:  Export rank is based on export shares at given time period while multiplier rank is based on the 
normalized output multipliers, estimated by dividing the four-quarter cumulative impulse responses to each of 
the growth shocks against the responses to its own shock. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Export Shares with ASEAN, 1978Q1-2018Q 
  
  
 
 
Notes: Sin – Singapore; Mal – Malaysia; Tha – Thailand; Phl – Philippines; and Ind – India. Export share refers 
to exports going to the partner (ASEAN5) to total exports of the reporter (individual AMS). A higher export 
share indicates a higher degree of integration between countries. 
Source: IMF (2019). 
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Notes 
1 The trade tensions can also affect the region’s direct exports to the US, and not just China (Tham et al., 2019). 
2 Direct effects refer to the influence of one country’s output growth on that of another, through the bilateral trade 
connections between them. The indirect effects capture the impact of one country on another via its influence on 
the output growth of its trading partners - through supply chains and third markets. Indirect effects mean that 
shocks in one economy can affect other economies and regions despite weak direct trade linkages (Dungey et al., 
2018). 
3 Global shock is approximated by the US and China. 
4 The vast literature has focused on quantifying the impacts of difference channels of shocks, namely monetary 
and financial shocks. 
5 The export data from Singapore to Indonesia are not available at the start of the sample period and thus the 
corresponding imports of trading partners are used as exports data for that period. 
6 Latest quarterly data available at the time of study is 2018Q2. Since the data ends at 2018Q2, there is only a 
limited coverage of the US-China trade war episode that began in January 2018. 
7 With quarterly data, we can have a sufficiently long time series, which is needed for reliable statistical inference.  
8 Dungey et al. (2018) provides justification for the selection of trade (exports) weights. 
9 The SVAR framework is considered suitable as we are only dealing with a relatively small number of variables. 
10 The IIT is calculated using the aggregate Grubel-Lloyd (1975) index, at the harmonized system (HS) 6-digit 
level for 2017. 
                                                          
